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Old Serbia or Kosovo Proper:  
Examining National Liberation in the 
Balkan Peninsula 
 
Mary Kate Schneider 
 
 
State and national boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula of 
southeastern Europe have been shifting for hundreds of years, 
albeit not necessarily in concordance with one another other. 
This disparity between state and national boundaries has 
produced a deeply-rooted nationalist conflict. Divisions 
between religious and ethnic groups are sharp, and the jagged 
edges of centuries-old feuds remain relevant today. Kosovo, a 
small province in southern Serbia sharing borders with 
Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), and newly independent Montenegro, is the 
Balkans’ oldest and latest staging ground for nationalist 
mobilization. In many ways it is the crux of a people’s national 
identity, thereby intensifying its inclination toward bitter and 
impassioned conflict. Perhaps most importantly, Kosovo is 
poised to become Europe’s next epicenter of national 
liberation. The circumstances leading up to and surrounding 
this conflict can be explained in terms of two theories of 
nationalism: the rational actor assumption, and the principle 
of self-determination.  
 
Kosovo: A Brief Overview 
On the surface, it would appear that disputes over 
Kosovo and other areas in the Balkans are so ingrained that 
they are almost tribally rooted, and therefore are an inborn 
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trait inherent to the regional population. Historical context, 
however, offers justification for these agendas. 
Kosovo is not prized for economic benefits, and it is not 
fought over for its natural resources or geographic location. 
The Serbs hold Kosovo dear because Kosovo is where they 
were met and defeated by the Turkish imperialists who would 
rule oppressively for six centuries. 
Although the province today is predominantly 
populated by ethnic Albanians (Kosovar Albanians), it 
remains an autonomous province under greater Serbia (it has 
also been administered by the United Nations since 1999).  Its 
minority population consists of pockets of Serbs, Turks, and 
Bosniaks. For the purposes of this discussion, it should be 
noted that there are two distinct groups of Serbs that play an 
important role; unless otherwise noted, “the Serbs,” and 
“Serbians” refer to Serbs living in modern Serbia, and 
“Kosovar Serbs” refer to a minority group of Kosovars who 
can claim Serbian ethnicity. 
The two primary parties engaged in the territorial 
dispute over Kosovo are the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, a 
dichotomy that can be defined not only ethnically but also 
religiously and linguistically.  The vast majority of Serbs are 
Eastern Orthodox, while an equally vast majority of Kosovars 
are Muslims, converted by the Ottoman Turks beginning in 
the 14th century. The historical relationship between the Turks 
and Serbs is profound, marked by nearly 600 years of Turkish 
dominance over the Serbs following the fateful June 28th, 1389 
Battle of Kosovo, when the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović 
was killed by the invading Turks on the Plain of Kosovo 
(Kosovo Polje, meaning “Field of Blackbirds”105). The outcome 
                                                 
105 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1943), 835.  
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of this battle effectively preserved the prince as a martyr for 
the defeated Serbian people and transferred Old Serbia in its 
entirety (including Kosovo) under the domain of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman Empire maintained control throughout 
the Balkans until the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century, 
when the Balkan League would drive the Turks out of Kosovo 
during the First Balkan War of 1912.  
Prior to the Battle of Kosovo, the territory was simply 
called Old Serbia. Its inhabitants were predominantly 
Christian and ethnically Serbian. After the Turks dominated 
Old Serbia, mass exodus on the part of the Serbs left villages 
and homes devoid of residents. Albanians migrated into 
Kosovo to fill the absence left by the original Serbs (Serbs 
claim that the Albanians have been attempting to “outbreed” 
them106).  This influx of Albanians was soon converted to Islam 
by the Turks and began to repopulate the region. This 
population shift has resulted in both parties claiming that they 
are the legitimate inhabitants of Kosovo, as the Serbs can claim 
to have occupied the region for most of history, while the 
Kosovar Albanians make the argument that Kosovo was 
abandoned by the Serbs.  
  
Recent Episodes of Nationalist Conflict in Kosovo 
The Kosovar conflict reached a boiling point in the 1990s 
after the post-Cold War break-up of Yugoslavia. As the most 
egregious offenses of the Balkan Wars had taken place in 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia between 1992 and 1993, the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 lulled the world into a 
false sense of security within the region. Meanwhile, 
nationalists in Serbia and Kosovo continued to run rampant, 
                                                 
106 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 34.  
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fueled by the fire that surrounded them, both literally and 
figuratively. The overworked Serbian war machine had nearly 
been bled dry, and paired with the Western world’s stringent 
economic sanctions, the culmination of these factors led to a 
sharp and painful spike in unemployment and inflation in 
Serbia.107 Similar to the domestic circumstances of the ill-fated 
Weimar Republic, the Serb populace viewed itself as very 
much the victims of the situation, and this feeling of 
victimization served to catalyze the already-flowing 
undercurrents of nationalism.  
The same perceived victimization permeated the 
collective mentality of Kosovar Albanians, as they felt largely 
ignored and excluded from the Dayton Accords. While 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was skillful in 
manipulating his constituency’s defeated psyche through the 
use of nationalist propaganda, Albanians were capitalizing on 
their own feelings of abandonment by the West, which led to 
the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The goals 
of the KLA were not limited strictly to the Kosovo province; 
rather, they included the ultimate goal of unification among 
Albanian peoples in Kosovo, FYROM, and Albania. The KLA 
was easily portrayed by Serbian elites to the international 
community as a terrorist organization, which only served to 
reinforce the Serbian nationalist identity. 
Tensions simmered in Serbia and Kosovo through 1998, 
marked by mutual atrocities. Serbian aggression mounted 
steadily, evolving into full-scale state military assaults that 
vastly outweighed the KLA’s grassroots and guerilla efforts. 
Conflict escalated so much so that Kosovo finally attracted the 
attention of the Western world. On March 24th, 1999, the North 
                                                 
107 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 444.  
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a bombing 
campaign on Serbia. Milosevic surrendered on June 3rd, 1999, 
soon after NATO introduced its Kosovo Protection Force 
(KFOR) peacekeeping mission. Concurrently, the United 
Nations mandated its United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a peacekeeping mission that 
continues to operate within the province to date.  
 
Theories of Nationalism: 
Micro- and Macro-Level Perspectives 
On the micro-level of analysis, consider the basic 
assumption that nationalists are rational actors; that is, that 
they act in accordance with their own self-interest. There are 
some problems with this assumption, as basic rational actor 
theory stipulates that the individual’s self-interest trumps any 
collective interests108—therefore, nationalist behavior by 
definition would be irrational, because it places the collective 
interest of the group above any individual motives. However, 
as Russell Hardin contends, rational action is an inherently 
subjective notion that cannot be universally defined, and 
actors act rationally if they do what they believe serves their 
interest.109 This suggests that the validity of this theory relies 
on some agreement as to what, exactly, can be considered the 
national actor’s self interest. On this note, Hardin suggests 
that, “The rational choice of ethnic, nationalist, or other group 
loyalty will be compelling if (1) it often happens that self-interest 
and group identification are congruent and if (2) actions that are 
                                                 
108 Russell Hardin offers a very cursory overview of this concept. See also 
literature concerning collective action and individual self-interest, 
particularly Mancur Olson, Thomas Schelling, Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz, et al.  
109 Russell Hardin, “Self-interest, group identity” in Albert Breton, et al., 
eds., Nationalism and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 14. 
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costly to the individual but beneficial to the group or nation 
are increasingly less likely the higher the individual costs.”110 
At the macro-level, understand that most instances of 
nationalist conflict involve to some extent the modern state, 
either as an oppressor or representative of a nation. The 
modern state is in itself a legal concept more than it is any 
tangible thing, and its continued existence relies on the 
international community’s willingness to abide by 
international law and normative customs (norms). But beyond 
merely establishing the existence of the modern state as a 
technical term, it is necessary to consider the concept of self-
determination. As a general principle of international law, self-
determination can be defined as: “…the right of a people 
living in a territory to determine the political and legal status 
of that territory—for example, by setting up a state of their 
own or choosing to become part of another state.”111 Thus, 
analyses of self-determination as well as the modern state go 
hand in hand. Still, the details surrounding self-determination 
have yet to be agreed upon, and so there are numerous 
ambiguities that need clarification. Who has a right to self-
determination, and why? Does self-determination rest in 
parallel with the state? If so, are stateless nations denied the 
right to self-determination?  
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations addresses 
the issue of nations and self-determination, stating that one of 
the fundamental purposes of the international organization is 
to: “…develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
                                                 
110 Ibid, 15 (italics original).  
111 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 
(New York: Routledge, 1997), 326.  
Schneider 
197 
of peoples…”112 Interpreted literally, it would appear that 
international law, or at the very least international norms, 
requires that self-determination not be restricted to states 
whose sovereignty has the benefit of legal recognition. This 
quickly poses a problem, because once something becomes a 
universal entitlement, it becomes very difficult to delineate 
where one nation’s right to self-determination begins and 
another nation’s ends. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Senator, 
U.N. Ambassador, and sociologist, somewhat sarcastically 
criticizes universal self-determination when he says that, 
“…the tribes would demand self-determination. It was, after 
all, their right, enshrined in the United Nations Charter.”113  
 
Theories of Nationalism and Kosovo 
Applications of the theory of nationalist rational self-
interest in Kosovo are ambiguous, in that self-interest is 
subjectively defined. According to the realist theory of 
international relations, the primary interest of the state is the 
security of the state.  At both the individual or nationalist 
level, this means that the security (preservation) of the 
individual or nation is the primary interest of individuals and 
nations. The self-interested Kosovar Albanian is rational when 
he acts in such a manner as to preserve the Kosovar nation, 
and this is sufficient justification for nationalist movements 
such as the KLA to exist and operate. The ambiguity lies in the 
fact that just as the Kosovar Albanian’s self-interest is 
subjectively defined, so too is the self-interest of the Serbs. The 
Serbs are equally motivated by their own national self-
preservation as are the Kosovars, so while it is possible for 
                                                 
112 Charter of the United Nations, available at: 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter  
113 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 66 (emphasis added). 
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both parties to be acting rationally at all times, it is not 
possible to escape the stalemate between Serbian and Kosovar 
Albanian nationalist motivations that occurs through the 
application of this theory. 
However, to characterize the conflict in the Balkans as 
inescapable is to deny the situation’s essential human 
component—Robert Kaplan calls this effect 
“dehumanizing.”114 Therefore, because the motivations of 
Kosovar and opposing Serb nationalists can be explained in 
terms of serving their individual rational self-interest, it would 
be fallacious to assume that the fault line dividing Kosovars 
and Serbs is ineffaceable. It is possible that nationalist 
differences can be reduced to micro-level security dilemmas; 
the only distinction is that rather than requiring states to play 
the key actors, they involve people. The trick is, then, to strike 
a more fine-tuned balance of power. In this vein, Barry Posen 
discusses the “disappearance” of sovereigns, mentioning 
Yugoslavia in particular.115 The absence of sovereigns implies 
anarchy, and a state of anarchy both instigates and 
perpetuates the security dilemma. The role of anarchy applies 
to states as well as nations, as both entities can be threatened 
out of existence by a more powerful state or nation. However, 
because the balance of power between nations often involves 
different kinds of variables than the balance of power among 
states (for example, nations must account for their 
psychological make-up in addition to their defense 
capabilities), more focused effort is required to establish and 
maintain balance.  
                                                 
114 Kaplan, “Why the Balkans Demand Amorality.” The Washington Post 
(February 28th, 1999) in Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, xx.  
115 Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35:1 
(1993), 28. 
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The other side of rational self-interest as it relates to 
nationalism raises the question: at what point does the interest 
of the group overwhelm the self-interest of the individual? 
Hardin relates a scenario in which a Croatian during the 
Bosnian wars says, “I really don’t hate Muslims—but because 
of the situation, I want to kill them all.”116 Here, the Croatian 
was forced to deny his initial self-interest, which was to wait 
out the war without getting directly involved, in favor of his 
secondary self-interest, which is to maintain his insider 
position within the community. The Croatian’s group 
membership protected him from being targeted but instead 
required him to sacrifice some element of his self-interest.  
In light of the possibility that the interest of the group 
can override individual self-interest, Samantha Power’s 
analysis of ground-level activity in Serbia during the 1999 
NATO bombing campaign is insightful: “Serb units began to 
mutiny and to desert. They did not want to die for Kosovo, 
and they certainly did not want to die for Milosevic.”117 This 
shift in loyalties hints at the lack of individual-level nationalist 
commitment held by the Serbs in 1999, and the fact that their 
supposed individual self-interest is so susceptible to external 
elements asks the question of whether or not this theory is 
well-suited to explaining nationalist motivations surrounding 
Kosovo.  
Taking a step back from individual rationality, consider 
the larger question of self-determination as it applies to 
Kosovo. Although its legal position is that of an autonomous 
province under the dominion of Serbia proper, Kosovo is 
presently administered by the United Nations under UNMIK, 
and has been since 1999. Kosovar Albanians, of whom 
                                                 
116 Hardin, 35.  
117 Power, 459.  
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approximately 90% of the population of Kosovo is 
comprised118, have indicated through numerous outlets that 
they would prefer to sever their connection to Serbia. 
Considering the fact that the physical territory is already 
occupied and governed by non-Serbs, it seems logical that 
Kosovo should be granted de jure sovereignty and the 
permission to act as a self-governing state, since much of this 
is already fulfilled on a de facto basis. However, if Kosovo does 
indeed have a right to self-determination, that right infringes 
on Serbia’s equal right to self-determination. Both nations 
have laid claim to the land. If the assumption is that the right 
to self-determination is truly universal, it should follow that 
few nations will ever enjoy self-determination to the fullest 
possible extent, because one nation’s rights will always 
overlap another’s.  
Other considerations for self-determination in Kosovo 
include a potential independence referendum. It is difficult to 
determine who should have the right to participate in such a 
referendum, because its implications are so widespread. As 
Kosovar Serbs and other ethnic groups within Kosovo are 
outnumbered roughly 9 to 1 by Kosovar Albanians, the likely 
outcome of a referendum that only permits citizens of Kosovo 
to vote should be fairly obvious. But if Serbia’s historical claim 
to Kosovo is legitimate, should not Serbs have the right to vote 
as well? If that were the case, then pro-independence Kosovar 
Albanians would be severely outnumbered, and again, the 
outcome of the referendum should be obvious.  
 
Evaluations and Inferences 
Although nationalist divisions within the Balkan region 
have existed throughout history, the fact that they continue to 
                                                 
118 Power, 445. 
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exist today is significant, and highlights the possibility that 
nationalist identities may burn more brightly than any other 
allegiances. 
Particularly pressing issues are the possibility of an 
independence referendum in the near future119, and the effect 
that that might have on the accession of Serbia proper and/or 
the newly-created Kosovar state to the European Union (EU). 
It is ironic to note that there appears to be a paradoxical 
outcome to this situation: for Serbia to join the EU, it is 
expected that Serbia will resolve the conflict over Kosovo. 
However, by drawing such attention to the conflict, Serbs and 
Kosovars alike are doing the political equivalent of rubbing 
salt in each other’s ancient wounds, constantly reminding 
themselves of both parties’ offenses. This, in turn, will 
exacerbate the nationalist movements,  Serbia has the option to 
willfully rescind its claim over Kosovo and acknowledge the 
Kosovar Albanians’ right to self-determination, thereby 
serving the Serbian self-interest of increased likelihood of 
accession to the EU. Should Serbia choose this option, it must 
make a concerted, genuine effort to contain grassroots-level 
Serb nationalist violence against Kosovars. This represents the 
sacrifice of one Serbian interest in favor of another; for it to be 
successful, the Serbian government’s preference of EU 
membership over possession of Kosovo must be accepted by 
the Serb people. 
Serbia’s alternative option is to maintain its interest in 
controlling Kosovo above and beyond all other preferences. 
Again, for this to be nationally supported (which it must be, 
for it to be successful, given the propensity for violence), the 
                                                 
119 Joachim Rücker, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
has urged a swift resolution of Kosovo’s status, preferably sooner than the 
January 21st, 2007 general elections scheduled to take place in Serbia 
(Source: UNMIK News, http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#1312).  
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Serbian government must convince the Serb people that it is in 
their rational self-interest to maintain Kosovo. As the Serbs 
have previously demonstrated an unwillingness to die for 
Kosovo, it is not likely that this will survive as a long-term 
Serbian policy. Additionally, the Serbs cannot maintain more 
than one primary interest, and it is not probable that Serbia 
will reverse on its attempts to gain EU membership. It appears 
that the Kosovars are the ones who can afford to sit and wait 
things out, as it is popularly understood that Serbia will be 
forced to recognize the new Kosovo’s territorial identity as the 
cost of joining the EU.120 The likelihood of a successful 
independence referendum is high, especially when considered 
in light of Montenegro’s recent bid for independence. 
The Albanian Kosovars’ drive toward self-determination 
has proven more adept at providing stronger nationalist 
cohesion than Serbian self-interest. During the 1999 NATO 
strikes, Serbs took the opportunity to retaliate against 
Albanian Kosovars, relentlessly massacring and burning 
villages to the ground for nearly three months. However, as 
Serbs in Serbia grew weary of the battle and began to defect 
under Milosevic, Albanian Kosovars maintained the integrity 
of their movement and did not waver from their cause. Rather, 
hard as it was to see Kosovo as victorious when the price ha[d] 
been entire families [of Kosovar Albanians], the Kosovar 
Albanian survivors treated these sacrifices as the price of 
freedom.121  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 “A Province Prepares to Depart,” The Economist (November 2nd, 2006) 
121 Power, 460.  
Schneider 
203 
Works Cited 
 
Hardin, Russell. “Self-interest, group identity,” in Albert 
Breton, et al., eds., Nationalism and Rationality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14-42. 
 
Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 
 
Malanczuk, Peter. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to Inter-
national Law. New York: Routledge, 1997.  
 
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Pandaemonium. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993.  
 
Posen, Barry. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” 
Survival 35:1 (1993), 27-47. 
 
Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002.  
 
United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations” [online] 
Available from the World Wide Web: (http://www.-
un.org/aboutun/charter/)  
 
West, Rebecca. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. New York: The 
Viking Press, 1943. 
 
